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Abstract: This paper will argue that the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 
ignores the background against which it was formed, while multilevel governance 
provides a useful analysis of that background. This paper will attempt to use 
multilevel governance to analyse European private law. The interdependence of 
actors in a multilayered European private law necessitates that, in forming European 
private law, governance questions, asking, for example, what actor possesses 
competence to legislate in private law and what actor possesses important key 
resources, should precede the formation of European private law. Arguably, 
governance adds a perspective on the way in which European private law should be 
formed. It has become necessary to adopt different approaches in the formation of 
European private law, which can cope with the multilevel character of European 
private law. This multilevel governance analysis of European private law has been 
ignored in the formation of the DCFR. Taking into account the insights provided by 
this analysis, choices made in the formation of the DCFR can be questioned. In 
particular, the form of the DCFR, which is reminiscent of Civil Codes, as well as the 
failure to take into account relevant European Union policy and the possibility of 
adopting different approaches that would take into account the role of non-state 
actors, or self-regulation provided by non-state actors, can be criticised. These 
choices are not compensated for by the emphasis on the participation of “civil 
society” in the formation of the DCFR. 
 
1. Introduction 
In Western Europe, private law is primarily regulated by the state legislator and 
judiciary in Civil Codes and case law.1 For reasons of legal certainty, simplicity, and 
surveyability,2 these Civil Codes seek to provide a coherent whole of comprehensive, 
systematic private law rules.3 There is an abundant amount of literature on the future 
of private law in the Union, especially on the desirability of further harmonisation of 
national private laws.4
                                                   
∗ Esther van Schagen is a PhD student at the Civil Law Department of Tilburg University. 
  
1 M W Hesselink, The new European private law (2002) 12. 
2 E O H P Florijn, Ontstaan en ontwikkeling van het nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1994) 10. 
3 M B M Loos, The influence of European consumer law on general contract law and the need for 
spontaneous harmonisation (lecture UvA) 2006 2.  
4 See for example U Mattei, “Hard Code now!” (2002) Global Jurist Frontiers 1, U Drobnig, “Scope 
and general rules of the European Civil Code” (1997) ERPL 1997 489, A S Hartkamp, E H Hondius 
(eds), Towards a European Civil Code (2004), G Alpa, “European Community Resolutions and the 
codification of ‘private law’” (2000) ERPL 321, O Lando, “Optional or mandatory Europeanisation of 
contract law” (2000) ERPL 59, M J Bonell, “The need and possibilities of a codified European contract 
law” (1998) ERPL 505, P Legrand, “Against a European Civil Code” (1997) MLR 44, J M Smits (ed.), 
The need for a European contract law; Empirical and legal perspectives (2005). 
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One of the instruments emerging from the debate on the future of European 
private law is the DCFR. The DCFR is meant to revise the private law acquis, but it 
also aims to become a “toolbox” for judges and legislators and a basis for an optional 
instrument.5 Opinions are divided about the DCFR: it provoked both criticism and 
praise.6
This paper will argue that the DCFR ignores the analysis provided by 
multilevel governance. This paper will concentrate on the formation process of the 
DCFR, arguing that the drafters of the DCFR should have taken notice of the context 
in which the DCFR was formed. Multilevel governance offers a useful analysis of that 
context.  
  
Moreover, it will be argued that the multilevel structure of European private 
law has affected the way in which private law is formed. This multilevel structure 
calls for different approaches in the formation of European private law that can cope 
with the multilevel structure of European private law. Furthermore, the 
interdependence of actors forming European private law necessitates that governance 
questions, asking for example what actor is competent to legislate, or what actors 
possess important key resources, precede the formation of private law.  Especially in 
the private law acquis, the multilevel structure of European private law and the 
interdependence between actors may influence the sort of rules adopted in private law 
that seek to provide a framework of rules for transactions between parties, such as the 
DCFR or Civil Codes. 
Paragraph 2 will briefly discuss the formation of the DCFR. Paragraph 3 will 
introduce the concept of multilevel governance. First, the multilevel character of 
European private law, also with regard to the DCFR, will be discussed. Second, 
governance in European private law will be considered. The paper questions whether 
the DCFR takes the analysis provided by multilevel governance into account.  
 
2. The formation of the DCFR 
                                                   
5 S. Vogenauer, “Common Frame of Reference and UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts: Coexistence, competition or overkill of soft law?” Oxford Legal Research 
Paper Series, forthcoming in 6 ERCL 2010, available via www.ssrn.com, argues that the aims and 
scope of the DCFR overlap with the UNIDROIT Principles, which is already a toolbox for legislator, 
as well as a tool used in education, and, to a lesser extent, an optional set of rules for commercial 
contracting parties. From this point of view, the added value of the DCFR can be questioned.   
6 See for example O Lando, “The structure and legal values of the CFR” (2007) 3 ERCL 245, H Beale, 
“The future of the Common Frame of Reference” (2007) 3 ERCL 257, Ch Von Bar, “Coverage and 
structure of the Academic Common Frame of Reference” (2007) 3 ERCL 350, M W Hesselink, “The 
Common Frame of Reference as a source of European private law”, (2009) Tul L R 920, H Eidenmüller 
et al, “The Common Frame of References for European private law” (2008) OJLS 659, N Jansen, R 
Zimmerman, “Restating the Acquis Communautaire? A critical examination of the ‘Principles of 
Existing EC Contract Law’” (2008) MLR 505, J M Smits, “The Draft-Common Frame of Reference 
(CFR) for a European private law: Fit for purpose?” (2008) Masst J Eur & Comp L 2008 145, H 
Collins, “Review of the DCFR” (2008) MLR 840, R Schultze, T Wilhelmsson, “From the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference towards European contract law rules” (2008) ERCL 154, S Grundmann, 
“The structure of the DCFR – Which approach for today’s contract law?” (2008) ERCL 225, F Cafaggi, 
H-W Micklitz (eds), European private law after the Common Frame of Reference – What future for 
European private law? (2010), A Vaquer, R Zimmerman (eds), European private law beyond the 
common frame of reference (2008).   
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The DCFR was formed by the academics in the Joint Network on European Private 
Law that was established by the Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme 
for Research, “Network of Excellence”.7 The Joint Network consists of several 
universities, institutes and other groups of academics.8
The DCFR contains principles,
  
9 definitions,10 and model rules11
The drafters of the DCFR were influenced quite prominently by the Principles 
of European Contract Law (‘PECL’), as established by the Commission on European 
Contract Law, which was the predecessor of the Study Group on a European Civil 
Code, which in turn played an important role in the formation of the DCFR. As the 
Commission on European Contract Law states in their introduction to the PECL, the 
private laws of states have been taken into account while drafting the PECL, but not 
all of these national systems have influenced all the provisions of the PECL. Other 
legal sources that have inspired the PECL are private laws from countries outside the 
Union, the UN Convention on the Sale of Goods, and “ideas that have not yet 
materialised in the law of any state”.
 covering large 
fields of private law. In this approach, the DCFR differs from the current, sector-
specific, private law acquis: it does not focus on specific topics with the aim of 
furthering the internal market or improving consumer protection. Instead, it adopts a 
comprehensive approach that is reminiscent of Civil Codes.  
12 Moreover, the drafters of the DCFR have taken 
comments of “stakeholders” relating to the adoption of the PECL in the DCFR into 
account. Finally, the acquis principles should ensure that “existing EC law is 
appropriately reflected”.13
In the formation of the DCFR, participation of “civil society” has been 
emphasised. Participation of stakeholders and other parties can lead to more extensive 
deliberation and thereby enhance problem-solving.
  
14
                                                   
7 See for more information on the Joint Network 
 Accordingly, participation in the 
www.copecl.org. 
8 The Study Group on a European Civil Code, the Research Group on Existing EC Private Law, and the 
Project Group on a Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law are directly involved in the 
drafting of the texts of the DCFR. The Association Henri Captant will comment on the philosophy of 
the DCFR, and the Societé de Législation Comparée will establish a database of comparative law. The 
Common Core Group compares the outcome of different cases under the Principles of European 
Contract Law and national laws. Other groups involved are the Conseil Supérieur du Notariat, the 
Research Group on the Economic Assessment of Contract Law Rules, the Database Group, and the 
Academy on European Law. Previously, some of these groups were involved in other projects: The 
Common Core Group researches the principles that are common to national private laws in Europe. 
The Study Group on a European Civil Code is the successor of the Commission of European Contract 
Law that drafted the Principles of European Contract Law. Several academics involved in the Study 
Group were also involved in the UNIDROIT working group on international commercial contracts.  
9 C von Bar, Outline edition of the DCFR (2009) at 9, refers to principles as fundamental principles: 
“essentially abstract basic values”.  
10 Meant as a starting point for a common European legal terminology, C von Bar et al, Outline edition 
of the DCFR (2009) at 17. 
11 Soft law rules that can serve as inspiration for national and supranational legislation, C von Bar et al, 
Outline edition of the DCFR (2009) at 18. 
12 Quote from the Commission on European Contract law, Introduction to the Principles of European 
Contract Law, at http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/survey_pecl.htm.  
13 C von Bar et al, Outline edition of the DCFR (2009) at 35. 




formation of the DCFR was effected in several ways: first, there was a consultation 
round on the possible future actions regarding private law by the Union. Second, the 
participation of legal experts was achieved by involving groups, consisting of 
academics and lawyers, in the Joint Network. Stakeholders’ experts were also 
involved in the drafting process in the CFR-net.15 Furthermore, participation was 
effected through workshops and conferences,16 resulting in several progress reports.17 
The European Parliament18 and the Council19
 
 also issued resolutions on European 
Contract Law.  
3. Perspectives from multilevel governance 
This paragraph will first introduce the concept of multilevel governance and go on to 
describe the analysis of European private law as a system of multilevel governance, in 
which competences to legislate are shared and the possession of ‘key resources’ is 
fragmented. The multilevel character of European private law will be discussed. The 
paragraph will then go on to consider governance in European private law. After 
discussing what the governance view means for European private law, it will go on to 
                                                   
15 C von Bar et al, Outline edition of the DCFR (2009) at 52. 
16 In chronological order: Workshop of the network of Member State Experts on European Contract 
law, 3 December 2004, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/workshop_summary.pdf, 
First Conference of the Network of Stakeholder Experts on the Common Frame of reference in the 
Area of European Contract Law, 15 December 2004, available at   
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/conference_report.pdf, 
Workshop of the Network of Member State Experts, 31 May 2005, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/experts_membstates3105_e
n.pdf, Conference on European Contract Law hosted by the UK Council Presidency and the European 
Commission, 26 September 2005, speeches available at    
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/conference26092005_en.ht
m, Conference on the Review of the Consumer Acquis and the Common Frame of Reference hosted by 
the Austrian Council presidency, 25-26 May 2006, speeches available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/conference052006_en.htm, 
Conference on the Common Frame of Reference (CFR) and the Review of the Consumer Acquis, 
hosted by the German Council Presidency, 1-2 March 2007, speeches available at   
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/conference01032007_en.ht
m.  
17 European Commission, First Annual Progress Report on European Contract law and the Acquis 
Review, COM (2005) 456 final, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/progress05_en.pdf, 
European Commission, Second Annual Progress Report on the Common Frame of Reference, COM 
(2007) 447 final, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/COMM_PDF_COM_2007_
0447_F_EN_ACTE.pdf. 
18 European Parliament resolution on European contract law and the revision of the acquis: the way 
forward, 2005/2022(INI), 23 march 2006, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do;jsessionid=C24BCB5021A77334792330C1544B1FA6
.node1?language=EN&pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2006-0109+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, and 
European Parliament resolution on European contract law, P6_TA(2006)0352, 7 September 2006, 
available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/ep_resolution_07092006_e
n.pdf.    





consider that the DCFR has not taken governance questions into account and indicate 
the implications of this view for the DCFR.   
 
3.1. Multilevel governance: an introduction   
The concept of multilevel governance was introduced by Marks:20
[W]e are seeing the emergence of multilevel governance, a system of 
continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers – 
supranational, national, regional, and local – as the result of a broad process of 
institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some 
previously centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and 
some down to the local/regional level.                 
  
 
Multilevel governance thus aims to describe the Union as a functional political 
system; it does not provide a normative prescription.21 Instead, multilevel governance 
emphasises developments in which the roles of governments across levels change and 
become more interdependent. The authority of the state has been fragmented: 
upwards, to the Union and international actors, downwards, to sub-national actors, 
and sideways, to non-governmental actors.22 The continuous interaction between the 
actors involved arises out of increasing interdependence between actors: on the one 
hand between governments across levels and on the other hand between governments 
and non-state actors.23 The increasing interdependence means that while the legal 
basis for decision-making remains an important question for effective decision-
making, these legal competences are, in matters of European private law,  shared 
competences, as becomes apparent from article 4, para. 2, subsections a and f 
TFEU.24
                                                   
20 G Marks, “Structural policy and multilevel governance in the EC” in A Cafruny and G Rosenthal 
(eds), The state of the European Community Vol. 2: The Maastricht debates and beyond (1993) 392. A 
Jordan, “The European Union: An evolving system of governance ... or government?” (2001) Policy & 
Politics 201, argues that multilevel governance is nothing new, but that it is ‘an amalgam’ of existing 
theories on European integration. S George, “Multilevel governance and the European Union” in: I 
Bache, M V Flinders (eds) Multilevel governance, at 125, confirms this but does not see it as 
problematic.    
 While state legislators and judiciaries have produced the primary sources of 
private law, Civil Codes and case law, competences to legislate have been reallocated 
especially to the supranational legislator, which has issued various Directives, as 
interpreted by the ECJ.  
21 S George, “Multi-level governance in the European Union” in I Bache and M V Flinders (eds) 
Multilevel governance (2004) at 113-114. See critically A Jordan, “The European Union: An evolving 
system of multi-level governance … or government?” (2001) Policy & Politics at 201. See for authors 
who do consider the distribution of competences over various levels as normatively superior: G 
Majone, “Europe’s “democratic deficit”: The question of standards” (1998) ELJ at 27-28 and R 
Dehousse, “European institutional architecture after Amsterdam: Parliamentary system or regulatory 
structure?” (1998) CMLRev at 612-613. 
22 L Hooghe, G Marks, “Unravelling the central state, but how? Types of multi-level governance”, 
(2003) Am Polit Sci Rev  233. 
23 I Bache and M V Flinders, “Themes and issues in multilevel governance”, in Bache and M V 
Flinders (eds), Multilevel governance (2004) 3. 
24 These are the competences with regard to the internal market and consumer protection. The 
Directives on European private law are mostly based on these articles. 
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Moreover, Hooghe and Marks25
[A]ctors under multi-level governance exert influence on the basis of diverse 
resources, including information, [o]rganization, expertise, financial resources, 
and legitimacy[.] 
 describe that in a system of multilevel 
governance, effective decision-making is not only based on legal competences, but on 




 has described the fragmentation of possession of these “key resources” among 
various actors. In private law, non-state actors can also be seen as possessing these 
key resources.  
3.2. A multi-layered European private law  
Current literature has repeatedly recognised the multilevel character of European 
private law, both as regards the shared competences to legislate on private law 
issues,27 and the increasing Europeanisation and globalisation that the national 
legislator is unable to control by itself.28
Especially the interdependence between the Union legislator and the national 
legislator has been recognised. First, the interdependence between the Union 
legislator and states’ legislators becomes apparent when considering that legislative 
competences in the area of private law are shared competences, as becomes clear in 
article 4 TFEU. In the area of consumer protection, article 169 TFEU makes clear that 
the Union has a contributory role. In addition, while the Union and states have shared 
competences, there is no legislator that has Kompetenz-Kompetenz in this area.
  
29 
Second, the character of national laws is said to have changed fundamentally because 
of the interference by the Union.30 The interdependence between actors goes further: 
supranational private law makes use of concepts developed in private laws, and 
cannot be formulated in isolation from national private laws.31
                                                   
25 G Marks and L Hooghe, “European integration and the state” (1995) EUI Working Papers at 7.  
 The interdependence 
26 C Scott, “Analysing regulatory space”, (2001) PL 329. 
27 Comp C Joerges, “Challenges of Europeanisation in the realm of private law: A plea for a new legal 
discipline” (2004) EUI Working Paper at 35 et seq. For example, V Mak, “Review of the consumer 
acquis – Towards maximum harmonisation?” (2008) TICOM Working Paper  has described how 
product liability is both covered by the product liability Directive and national tort law. Compare C 
Poncibò, “The challenge of EC consumer law”(2007) EUI Working Paper at 7, argues that one of the 
most important tasks is to determine how competences should be allocated between levels in order to 
determine to what extent the formation of private law rules could be de-centralised. 
28 F Cafaggi and H-W Micklitz, “Administrative and judicial collective enforcement of consumer law 
in the US and the European Community” (2007) EUI Working Paper at 1. 
29 M W Hesselink, “The ideal of codification and the dynamics of Europeanisation: The Dutch 
experience” (2006) ELJ  289. 
30 T Wilhelmsson, “Private law in the EU: Harmonised or fragmented Europeanisation?” (2002) ERPL 
82, J M Smits, “European private law: A plea for a spontaneous legal order” in D M Curtin and J M 
Smits (eds), European integration and law (2006) 6, L Niglia, The transformation of contract in 
Europe (2003) 93, 190, Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, “Social justice in 
European contract law: A Manifesto”  (2004) ELJ  670, N Reich, “Transformation of contract law and 
civil justice in the new EU Member Countries – The example of the Baltic states, Hungary and 
Poland”, (2004-2005) 23 Penn State International Law Review 620. 
31 N Jansen, R Zimmerman, “Restating the acquis communautaire? A critical examination of the 
‘principles of existing EC contract law’” (2008) MLR 517. 
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of actors in European private law becomes even more apparent in arguments for 
“reflexive harmonisation”,32 in which the development and harmonisation of 
European private law takes place through the development of consumer law and 
competition between national legal systems, eventually leading to the “bottom-up” 
development of European private law.33 The Study Group on Social Justice in 




Law production in the European Union’s multi-level system results from the 
continuous interaction between semi-autonomous actors comprising 
legislatures, the judiciary, and nongovernmental organisations, at different 
levels (...) Law making can neither be monopolised nor achieved in isolation 
by just one branch of government or a single institution.  
 
This debate on the multi-level structure of European private law has also been 
considered relevant for the form of the DCFR. While Hesselink35 asserts that the 
DCFR fits well within the structure of multilevel governance, Collins36
 
 states that in 
the formation of the DCFR, the multilevel structure of the Union has been overlooked 
when it should have been taken into account. A European Civil Code shows federalist 
characteristics: imposed by a central legislator, and enforced by a hierarchical court 
system. As Collins points out, the Union is very far from being a federal state. The 
Union has competence on particular matters, and it depends upon states for 
implementation and enforcement of its legislation. To complicate matters, it consists 
of states that do not share the same language. For these reasons, it is not possible for 
the Union to enforce a Civil Code similar to national Civil Codes.  
3.3. Governance in European private law 
Governance is in principle a public law concept on the question of the way in which 
authority is exercised, and at what level. This question is not typically a question 
arising in national private law discourse.37
                                                   
32 See for example C Poncibò, “The challenges of EC consumer law” (2007) EUI Working Paper at 6. 
 By the time a Civil Code or another 
national private law framework has been established, the question of governance is 
33 The European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on European contract law, COM (2001) 398 final, para 51, has recognised “soft 
harmonisation”, in which economic developments lead to policy initiatives on contract law at the 
national level.  
34 Study Group on Social Justice in Private Law, “Social justice in European contract law: A 
manifesto” (2004) ELJ  670. Compare H Collins, “The freedom to circulate documents: Regulating 
contracts in Europe” (2004) ELJ 6, at 789-790. 
35 M W Hesselink, “The Common Frame of Reference as a source of European private law” (2008) 
Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series, 22. 
36 H Collins, The European Civil Code. The Way Forward (2008) 182-183. Compare I Sammut, “Tying 
the knot in European private law” (2009) ERPL 821. 
37 Compare the seminal work of Dutch scholar P Scholten, Algemeen Deel (1974) nr 1, who judges that 
these questions are questions of public law: “Wel kan het weer een vraag worden welk gezag tot de 
vaststelling van de regel bevoegd is en waarom die de bevoegdheid bezit, doch met deze vragen houdt, 
wie privaatrecht beoefenen wil, niet bezig; dat zijn vragen van staatsrecht.” 
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already answered, and in national private law, alternative methods to exert authority 
take place within the framework provided by the Civil Code. What, then, is meant 
with “governance” in European private law, and why is governance relevant for 
European private law? This paragraph will first attempt to indicate what the 
governance perspective adds to the debate in European private law. Second, the 
paragraph will further elaborate on how the multilevel character of European private 
law has influenced the formation of European private law, and how “governance” is 
accommodated or even directly addressed in private law, both at a national and at a 
European level. Third, the paper will question whether the DCFR can be seen as 
“governance” and argue that the question of what approaches can be adopted to deal 




3.3.1. The governance perspective 
What is meant by “governance” and why is it relevant for European private law? 
Governance has not yet been subject to extensive debate in European private law.39 In 
public law, however, there is a large amount of literature on governance in general 
and the definition of “governance” varies. It has been contrasted to “government”,40 
but it has also been held to include “government”.41 Möllers42 states that governance 
provides an alternative, but not necessarily new, method to look at existing problems, 
and that governance can also be considered as a reaction to the context in which 
decision-making takes place. It is submitted that even though it is rarely used in 
private law discourse, “governance” can provide an additional perspective on the way 
in which the development and the formation of European private law should take 
place.43 Cafaggi and Muir-Watt,44 in their plea for governance in European private 
law, similarly emphasise the need for governance techniques that would allow 
European private law to cope with a complex multilevel system. In this regard, the 
Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law45 directly refers to the 
complex, multilevel background against which a European Civil Code would be 
formed, and at the ability of such a Code to cope with such a background. Micklitz46
                                                   
38 Compare H-W Micklitz, “The visible hand of European regulatory private law. The transformation 
of European private law from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation” (2008) EUI 
Working Papers 3-4. 
 
39 See for an extensive overview on research in contract law related to governance: F Möslein and K 
Riesenhuber, “Contract governance – A draft research agenda” (2009) 5 ERCL 248.    
40 J Scott, D M Trubek, “Mind the gap: Law and new approaches to governance in the European 
Union” (2002) ELJ 1.  
41 European Commission, European governance: A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final, at 7. 
42 Ch Möllers, “European governance: Meaning and value of a concept” (2006) CMLRev 314-318. 
43 In Dutch private law, these questions could perhaps also be considered as questions on 
“rechtsvinding”.   
44 F Cafaggi and H Muir-Watt, “Introduction” in F Cafaggi and H Muir-Watt (eds), Making European 
private law. Governance design (2008) 4. 
45 Study Group on Social Justice in Private Law, “Social justice in European contract law: A 
manifesto” (2004) ELJ 671.  
46 H-W Micklitz, “The visible hand of European regulatory private law. The transformation of 
European private law from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation” (2008) EUI 
Working Paper 4-5. 
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states that “governance” concentrates on the law-making process, and on other 
techniques than strict law-making, and also refers to “law in context” and “legal 
realism”. Möslein and Riesenhuber47 state that “governance” has no generally 
accepted definition and they choose not to define governance. Instead, they emphasise 
that a governance approach does not only look at rule-making; governance extends 
the view to other ‘steering mechanisms’ to influence behaviour, and especially looks 
at ‘the structure of the institutions that shape behaviour’. Governance is, from that 
point of view, not primarily concerned with the substantive private law rules. Instead, 
a governance perspective studies the formation of European private law and questions 
what actors form European private law, and how that affects parties’ behaviour.48
This paper seeks to provide a governance perspective that looks at the formation of 
European private law, and in particular the DCFR, which set rules for transactions 
between parties. While self-regulation or ‘new governance’ in private law usually 
takes place within the framework provided by Civil Codes, it will be argued that the 
formation of these frameworks has also changed. Private law systems, such as Civil 
Codes, but also the DCFR, which aspires to be a system, provide such frameworks 
for, for instance, contracts or torts. With regard to the DCFR, the governance 
perspective emphasises the need for the drafters to take into account the shared 
competences and fragmented possession of key resources, and the need for increased 
interaction between interdependent actors, which form the background against which 
the DCFR was formed. From that point of view, “governance” includes the question 
whether this background is visible in the formation of European private law. 
Therefore, instead of taking general definitions of “governance” as a starting point, 
this paper takes as a starting point that governance is a way to exercise power that 
takes into account the background against which the formation of European private 
law takes place. For the purposes of this paper, when I am talking about questions of 
“governance”, I refer to questions that ask by what actors and in what way private law 
should be formed, against the background of the multilevel structure of European 
private law. When asking questions on governance with regard to the DCFR, this 
paper tries to draw attention to the question in what way and by whom the DCFR 
should be formed. 
  
Moreover, the governance perspective in this paper seeks to demonstrate that, 
directly or indirectly, this governance perspective is also becoming visible within 
European private law, when rules in European private law directly address the role of 
non-state actors. Although governance does not usually concern itself with 
substantive private law, private law contained in Civil Codes may accommodate 
governance techniques or, in the private law acquis, directly address governance 
issues. This is not reflected in the DCFR. 
                                                   
47 F Möslein and K Riesenhuber, “Contract governance – A draft research agenda” (2009) 5 ERCL 251.  
48 Under this definition, various approaches to study governance in contract law are possible, as pointed 
out by F Möslein and K Riesenhuber, “Contract governance – A draft research agenda”, 5 ERCL 248-
249. Other approaches that can be adopted are ‘contract law as an institutional framework for private 
transactions’, at ‘the design of contract law as an instrument for steering behaviour and for achieving 




3.3.2. Governance and multilevel private law 
The question after governance is normally not a private law question, but rather a 
public law one. However, the multilevel character of European private law leads to 
questions of governance, as in the formation of private law, it has become necessary 
to take into account shared competences and the coexistence of private laws at 
different levels. The characteristics of a multilevel system, in which not only legal 
competences to form private law are shared, but also key resources such as expertise, 
organisational capabilities, or financial resources, necessitates that in forming 
European private law, questions about which actor possesses these resources and the 
interaction between these actors should precede the formation of private law 
frameworks. Möslein and Riesenhuber49
In forming private law, legislators adopt an approach that recognises that 
including non-state actors in the formation of private law may support legislative 
practices. The influence of non-state actors becomes apparent when the legislator uses 
co-regulation as a means to increase legitimacy or support for legislation:
 emphasise the “interplay of (…) different 
players and levels of regulation with respect to rule-making”. In turn, in a multilevel 
structure, in which actors have become interdependent, actors need to adopt 
approaches in the formation of European private law that can cope with this structure 
of multiple levels and interdependence. Accordingly, the formation of European 
private law, as well as substantive European private law itself, has changed. 
50 for 
example in the formation of new insolvency legislation51 or insurance law.52 At a 
European level, the recognition of the influence that non-state actors may have, can 
for example be found in the promotion of consultations that provide additional 
information and draw attention to controversial points.53
                                                   
49 F Möslein and K Riesenhuber, “Contract governance – A draft research agenda” (2009) 5 ERCL 261. 
 Looking at these practices, it 
may be argued that Union or state legislators apparently may not possess all key 
resources: non-state actors may possess information or expertise that may contribute 
to the quality of private law that is to be formed and state actors and non-state actors 
have become interdependent. That is especially visible when state actors provide a 
framework for self-regulation such as a Civil Code: even if there is a framework for 
self-regulation, its success may still depend on the actual use that is made of this 
framework by non-state actors. Consequently, the multilevel character of European 
private law in turn necessitates governance arrangements that can cope with this 
multilevel character.  
50 See critically on the use of co-regulation by the Union to increase legitimacy P Verbruggen, “Does 
co-regulation strengthen EU legitimacy?” (2009) ELJ 425.  
51 The draft bill was edited by the Commission on Insolvency law, chaired by Prof. S.C.J.J. Kortman, 
and an internet consultation was opened at the website of the Ministry of Justice, 
http://www.justitie.nl/onderwerpen/wetgeving/insolventiewet/, currently no longer available. An 
overview of the reactions of stakeholders is available under  http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-
en-publicaties/brieven. See for examples of other committees of experts drafting legislation in the area 
of private law  http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/wetgeving/privaatrecht.  
52 The draft bill was edited and revised by Prof. T.J. Dorhout Mees, and, after an extensive 
consultation, commented upon by legal practitioners and involved parties such as insurers: 
Asser/Clausing/Wansink 2007 (5-VI), nr 9.  
53 Mandelkern report on better regulation, Final report 2001, 7. 
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Furthermore, although these “governance” questions after competences or key 
resources are usually not a subject of discussion in private law discourse, Dutch 
private law does, in some cases, accommodate a role for non-state actors, by 
accommodating collective negotiating. For example, article 6:240 in the Dutch Civil 
Code gives legal persons that promote the interests of users of standard contract terms 
an action to declare the standard contract terms unfair, provided that the claimant has 
given the defendant the opportunity to negotiate on the fairness of the standard 
contract terms. In these cases, Dutch private law does not only give individual 
claimants the possibility of challenging the fairness of standard contract terms; in 
addition, organisations representing the interests of a group of claimants also have an 
action. Another example of the accommodation of collective bargaining is the use of 
“driekwart dwingend recht” in the Dutch Civil Code. Driekwart dwingend recht is in 
principle mandatory law for employment contracts that parties cannot deviate from in 
their contract. However, an exception can be made when the deviation of the 
mandatory provision is the result of a collective labour agreement (‘CAO’), which 
was formed during collective negotiations between unions and the employer, or the 
employers’ representative organisation. Admittedly, private law does not concern 
itself with the question regarding which unions are competent, and neither does it 
provide a framework for collective negotiations. However, indirectly, the Civil Code 
does recognise that the interests of employees may be adequately served by collective 
negotiations between on the one hand unions representing these employees and on the 
other hand their employers. Moreover, the Dutch legislator recognised that driekwart 
dwingend recht gives employers and unions the possibility to adapt contracts to the 
needs of particular branches, allowing for flexibility and experimentation.54 
Accordingly, provisions55
Although the debate on private law and governance questions remains separate 
at a national level, the divide is less strict at a European level, as becomes apparent 
when looking at the private law acquis. Directives address the role of non-state actors 
more directly, but at the same time, remain vague as to the precise implications on 
European private law. For example, article 16 Directive 2000/31 on e-commerce 
provides that both member states and the European Commission shall encourage the 
forming of codes of conduct by non-state actors. In addition, article 6 Directive 
2006/114 on misleading and comparative advertising stipulates that the Directive does 
not exclude voluntary control though self-regulatory bodies. Furthermore, the 
Directive explicitly states in article 5 that Member States may confer upon courts or 
administrative authorities enabling them to require publications to undo the effects of 
unlawful advertising. Directive 2005/29 on unfair commercial practices adopts yet 
another approach by sanctioning non-compliance with codes of conduct as a tort. Not 
only does the Directive expressly allow for codes of conduct in article 10, it also, in 
article 6 para. 2 subsection b of the Directive, specifically addresses non-compliance 
 in the Civil Code on employment contracts accommodate 
collective agreements. 
                                                   
54 This intention of the legislator can be found in parliamentary documentation: Kamerstukken II 
1996/97, 25 426, nr 1, 5-6. 
55 See for example articles 7:634, 7:638, 7:639, 7:664 in the Civil Code.   
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with firm, verifiable commitments in codes of conduct that the trader has recognised 
as binding in commercial practice, stipulating that this non-compliance will constitute 
a misleading commercial practice.  
 
3.3.3. The DCFR as “governance”?       
At first sight, the DCFR itself could be considered as “governance” as it is an 
alternative method trying to improve the quality of the widely criticised private law 
acquis. The DCFR itself demonstrates the increasing importance of non-state actors 
that paradoxically create non-binding rules and principles in the form of a typical 
“hard law” instrument like a Civil Code. When looking at the formation of the DCFR, 
it also becomes clear that the drafters have adopted a “typical” private law 
perspective, and they fail to address the “public law” questions on “governance”. 
Instead of considering what actors possessed important “key resources”, or what form 
would fit best within a multilayered private law, the private law experts went straight 
to the formation of a Civil Code-like framework and questions on substantive private 
law.   
Consequently, even if the DCFR is considered as “governance”, it is an odd 
form of governance that cannot be considered as providing a reaction to different 
institutional settings, in which actors have become interdependent and negotiate 
continuously. Therefore, despite the governance form of the DCFR, it can still be 
criticised for not taking into account its background, an analysis of which is provided 
by multilevel governance. This becomes apparent when looking at the DCFR more 
closely. First, it will be argued that the DCFR adopts the model of a Civil Code and a 
corresponding hierarchical approach. Second, the DCFR does not take into account, 
for example, Union policy underlying the private law acquis. Third, the DCFR does 
not address or even accommodate the role non-state actors, or rules provided by these 
non-state actors, may play in the formation of European private law or in the DCFR, 
in contrast to some of the private law acquis, and, less directly, at a national level, 
where the role of non-state actors is sometimes directly addressed, or less directly, 
accommodated. Fourth, despite the emphasis on the participation of “civil society”, it 
can be doubted to what extent the DCFR is the result of interaction between these 
actors.  
First, the DCFR seems to ignore its surroundings since it pursues, almost 
blindly, a hierarchical, Civil Code approach. The approach that the DCFR has taken is 
reminiscent of the approach taken by Civil Codes56 and has therefore already been 
exposed to severe criticism. Hesselink57 specifically analyses the similarities between 
the DCFR and national Civil Codes: like Civil Codes, the DCFR is comprehensive, it 
is systematic, it is situated at one level of governance, and, according to the European 
Commission,58
                                                   
56 C Von Bar, “Coverage and structure of the Academic Frame of Reference” (2007) ERCL 354.  
 it does not aim at reform but at improving the quality of the private 
57 M W Hesselink, “The ideal of codification and the dynamics of Europeanisation: The Dutch 
experience” (2006) ELJ 293.  




law acquis without substantive changes.59 Moreover, national private law is usually 
considered as a self-referential system, which is also clearly visible in the approach 
taken by the DCFR, as the drafters60 have specifically stated that: “consumer law is 
not a self-standing area of private law. It consists of some deviations from the general 
principles of private law, but it is built on them and cannot be developed without 
them.” The comprehensive, non-sector specific approach is result of the drafters’ 
assumption that: “the whole of the law of obligations [is] ... an organic entity or unit.” 
Moreover, in conformity with the White Paper on governance,61  the DCFR clearly 
underlines a hierarchical approach towards European private law. Ultimately, in the 
formation of the DCFR, the European Commission retained a central role: the 
European Commission, together with the European Parliament, has taken the 
initiative, and guided the progress on the DCFR, and it was the intention that the 
DCFR would result in a political Common Frame of Reference. The European 
Parliament,62 for example, has clearly expressed this expectation: in its 2006 
resolution, it called on the Commission “to submit without delay a clear legislative 
plan setting out the future legal instruments by which it aims to bring the results of the 
work of the research groups and the CFR-Net into use into legal transactions”. The 
DCFR is clearly aimed at improving the quality of Union legislation, and eventually, 
a starting point for a European Civil Code.63
There are a number of objections that can be made against the current form of 
the DCFR. First, unfortunately, the DCFR is not the result of a careful analysis of the 
benefits and detriments of the hierarchical regulatory technique of a Civil Code. 
Instead, it seems to have been constructed against the background of national private 
laws and the PECL: it seems easier to develop something similar to these 
instruments.
  
64 This is confirmed by Von Bar,65 who states: “There might be other 
methods (...) but so far no one has tried them or even proved that they would also 
work.” Thus, the DCFR even fails to consider the question what form the DCFR 
should take as relevant at all: it never arises. This reasoning has rightly been severely 
criticised, as the Union lacks the governance methods, or the court system, to enforce 
a Civil Code.66
                                                   
59 N Jansen and R Zimmerman, “Restating the acquis communautaire? A critical examination of the 
‘principles of existing EC contract law’” (2008) MLR 530 et seq, however rightly argue that both the 
Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Acquis Group have made political choices, and point 
out that “the establishment of a Civil Code would amount to a transformation of private law which 
would no longer be guided by the idea of corrective justice”.  
 It can be seriously doubted whether a model like the Civil Code can 
60 C von Bar et al, Outline edition of the DCFR (2009) 24-25. See differently, for example, H-W 
Micklitz, “The necessity of a new concept for the further development of the consumer law in the EU” 
(2003) 4 German Law Journal 10 1048. 
61 See also J M Scott and D M Trubek, “Law and new approaches to governance in the EU: mind the 
gap” (2002) ELJ 2.  
62 European Parliament resolution on European contract law, P6_TA(2006)0352, 7 September 2006, 
point 15. 
63 C von Bar et al, Outline edition of the DCFR (2009) at 38, 41, 45. 
64 M Kenny, “Constructing a European Civil Code: Quis custodiet Ipsos Custodes?” (2006) 12 Colum J 
Eur L 805.  
65 C von Bar, “Coverage and structure of the Academic Frame of Reference” (2007) ERCL 354. 
66 H Collins, The European Civil Code. The Way Forward (2008) 182-183. H Collins, “Governance 
implications for the European Union of the changing character of private law” in F Cafaggi and H Muir 
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simply be transposed to the supranational level without further consideration. A Civil 
Code is characteristic of a “federalist” type of governance as described by Hooghe 
and Marks:67 governance takes place at a limited number of levels that “bundle 
together multiple functions, including a range of policy responsibilities and [...] a 
court system and representative institutions.” Hooghe and Marks continue by 
remarking that centralist government is not the best method to deal with diversity, but 
that multilevel governance provides decision-makers with an opportunity to ‘adjust 
the scale of governance’. Moreover, the question arises how the DCFR, especially a 
later binding Common Frame of Reference, will relate to the diversity of national 
Civil Codes at a national level.68 Furthermore, the DCFR does not address the 
question at which level law-making should take place. However, it would be 
appropriate to do this, considering the general competence and established Civil 
Codes at a national level. Moreover, the increasing interdependence between actors in 
multi-level governance may pose problems for “traditional” hierarchical decision-
making through legislation,69 as both legal competences and ‘key resources’ needed 
for effective decision-making may not all be in the hands of drafters of the DCFR: 
competences to legislate on private law are divided between states and the Union, and 
non-state actors may possess expertise, financial resources or organisational capacity 
that state legislators or the Union do not possess. Conversely, decision-making within 
multilevel governance, where actors are interdependent, is not necessarily 
hierarchical.70
Second, the DCFR does not take into account its surroundings: for example, 
Union consumer policy underlying part of the private law acquis. As becomes clear 
when looking at the DCFR rules on unfair contract terms, in articles II: 9:401 et seq, 
the DCFR seeks to provide a higher level of protection than Directive 93/13, for 
example by imposing that standard contract terms that are not drafted in plain, 
intelligible language, can be unfair for that reason alone. In contrast, the Union 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Watt (eds), Making European private law. Governance design (2008)  283, finds that for similar 
reasons, full harmonisation of private law, which relies on strong hierarchical enforcement 
mechanisms, is problematic.  
67 L Hooghe and G Marks, “Unravelling the central state, but how? Types of multilevel governance” 
(2003) 97 Am Polit Sci Rev 2, 236. 
68 On the one hand, M W Hesselink, “The ideal of codification and the dynamics of Europeanisation: 
The Dutch experience” (2006) ELJ at 295 et seq argues that member states will have to review their 
strategies towards codification. He moreover argues that because the DCFR is comprehensive, 
systematic, coherent, and located at one level of governance it will gain authority: M W Hesselink, 
“The Common Frame of Reference as a source of European private law” (2008) Centre for the Study of 
European Contract Law Working Paper Series, at 5, 7. On the other hand, C Joerges, “The challenges 
of Europeanization in the realm of private law: A plea for a new legal discipline” (2004) EUI Working 
Paper 12, at 19-20 argues that an instrument similar to a  European Civil Code, establishing 
comprehensiveness and coherency similar to national Civil Codes, would not fit within the multilevel 
governance structure of the EU, where national legislation and supranational legislation have diverging 
objectives. 
69 Compare F Cafaggi and H Muir Watt, “The making of European private law: regulation and 
governance design” (2006) Newgov Paper series 19.  
70 C Scott, “Analysing regulatory space” (2001) PL 330. 
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consumer policy strategy set out by the European Commission71 makes clear that, in 
the private law acquis, the protection of consumers should be seen in the context of 
furthering the internal market, since confident, well-informed consumers are 
considered more likely to become involved in cross-border trade. In order to increase 
the confidence of not only consumers, but also businesses, in the internal market, 
targeted full harmonisation is adopted, as this degree of harmonisation is seen as more 
likely to achieve legal certainty, even if it may decrease the level of consumer 
protection. Therefore, while the DCFR is based on rules established in Directives, it 
goes against the tendency visible in the private law acquis. Additionally, the drafters 
may not have been able to take the multilevel context of the DCFR sufficiently into 
account. Twigg-Flesner72
Third, the DCFR does not take into account the role that non-state actors, or 
rules provided by these non-state actors, may play in the formation of the DCFR.
 states that the drafters of the acquis principles, as 
incorporated in the DCFR, should have had more time to take into account the 
“complex interaction between national and European legislation”. 
73 
Yet the role of non-state actors in the formation of European private law - and the 
DCFR - should be noted.74 Non-state actors can either form rules separately from the 
state or they can try to influence decision-making by making use of their ‘key 
resources.’ An example of non-state actors influencing the formation of European 
private law is the International Swaps and Derivation Association (‘ISDA’) 
possessing ‘key resources’ like information, organisation and financial resources, 
using these ‘key resources’ to (successfully) plead for reform of the law on financial 
collateral in the internal market (resulting in Directive 2002/47 on financial collateral 
agreements).75 Furthermore, at an international level, non-state actors can influence 
the behaviour of members of a specific sector by providing codes of conduct: for 
example, the European Trade Association representing e-commerce and mail-order 
(EMOTA) has established the European convention on cross-border mail order and 
distance selling,76
                                                   
71 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013, Empowering consumers, 
enhancing their welfare, effectively protecting them, COM (2007) 99 final. 
 and the Dutch home shopping association (‘Nederlandse 
72 Ch Twigg-Flesner, “The Acquis Principles: An insider’s critical reflections on the drafting process” 
in C Baasch Andersen and M Andeneas (eds), Theory and practice of harmonisation, forthcoming (via 
www.ssrn.com) 19. 
73 The examples of self-regulation in this paper concern well established, often-used self-regulation that 
might, for example, be considered in forming private law frameworks. That is not to say that all forms 
of self-regulation or co-regulation should not be subject to a critical assessment before being taken into 
account in the formation of private law.  
74 Compare F Cafaggi, “Self-regulation in European contract law” (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal 
Studies who has pointed to the role that self-regulation may play in European contract law, by 
complementing or substituting European legislation. Comp G-P Callies, “The making of transnational 
contract law” (2007) Ind J Global Legal Studies 469. 
75 See the reports from the ISDA, pleading for regulation to eliminate barriers for cross-border 
transactions involving money or stocks as security: ISDA, Collateral Arrangements in the European 
Financial Markets, The Need for National Law Reform (available at www.isda.org ) en ISDA, 
Collateral Survey 2000, ch 7.4. See critically on the Directive and its Dutch implementation L P W van 
Vliet, “De financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomst, een tussenbalans” (2005) NTBR, 190 et seq. 




thuiswinkel organisatie’) has based its code of conduct on this convention. Moreover, 
in this way, non-state actors can try to add to international, European and national 
regulation and thereby further the European internal market. Especially if private 
actors have a similar aim to the private law acquis – to further the internal market – it 
would not be illogical to take note of the rules that these actors have developed. 
But while the analysis of multilevel governance should be taken into account 
when forming the framework the DCFR aspires to be, this analysis may also result in 
different sorts of rules being included in the DCFR. If it explicitly or implicitly tries to 
clarify the roles of actors, the DCFR may not turn out to be a strictly “classical” 
private law instrument. This may be illustrated when looking at the current rules on 
unfair contract terms in the DCFR, in articles II:9:401 et seq DCFR. Clearly, these 
provisions refer to the terminology used in Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts. The DCFR goes considerably further than the Directive, in 
extending its scope to contract terms between businesses, or contract terms between 
consumers. In the formation of the DCFR, there are various alternatives to this 
approach, but these alternatives may include taking into account, whether directly or 
indirectly, questions of governance.77
First, in forming the DCFR, the drafters could have looked to often-used rules 
drafted by non-state actors, for example the ICC or branch organisations. In not 
consistently doing so, without apparent reason, the DCFR fails to recognise that its 
success may also depend on the actual use made of these rules. Currently, the rules in 
the DCFR are vague, and businesses may prefer the international standards terms and 
conditions or models from the ICC that leave considerably less room for legal 
uncertainty. Consequently, it is not very likely that (large) businesses will refer to the 
DCFR rules on unfair contract terms, and it seems as unlikely that national judges 
dealing with contracts between businesses will refer to these terms.  
  
Second, the DCFR could have addressed or accommodated the question what 
role non-state actors may have in negotiating on contract terms, for example by 
looking at collective bargaining between consumer organisations and branch 
organisations, or at the possibility of including codes of conduct in contracts.78 An 
instance of collective bargaining can be found in The Netherlands, within the Social 
and Economic Council of the Netherlands (‘Sociaal Economische Raad’, ’SER’),79
                                                   
77 Compare H Collins, “Governance implications for the European Union of the changing character of 
private law” in F Cafaggi and H Muir Watt (eds), Making European private law. Governance design 
(2008) 281, who states that European private law should decide whether to include transnational self-
regulation in European private law. 
 
where the Coordination Group on Negotiation for Self-regulation (‘Coordinatiegroep 
78 J Drexl, “Community legislation continued: Complete harmonisation, framework legislation or non-
binding measures – Alternative approaches to European contract law, consumer protection and unfair 
trade practices” (2002) EBLR 578, points out that the use of self-regulation in this area should not 
hinder the internal market. In its Green Paper on European Union Consumer protection, COM (2001) 
531 final, 14 et seq, the European Commission has suggested that for effective enforcement, non-
commitment to a code of conduct should be considered as unfair commercial practices (compare article 
6 para 2 subsection b Directive 2005/29 concerning unfair commercial practices).   
79 Although independent, the SER is established by the state by the law on business organisation (‘Wet 
op de Bedrijfsorganisatie 1950’) with businesses, unions and independent experts as members, and an 
advisory task to the government.   
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Zelfreguleringsoverleg’) provides a framework for facilitating negotiations between 
branch organisations and consumer organisations.80 In contrast to national private 
law, which may to some extent accommodate collective bargaining, or the private law 
acquis, which addresses questions of governance more directly, the DCFR does not 
accommodate or address questions of governance. Admittedly, when the DCFR 
directly addresses the role of non-state actors, the question may arise whether this sort 
of provision would be a very open provision, and whether it would decrease 
flexibility. Micklitz81
Fourth, despite the emphasis on the participation of “civil society”, it can be 
doubted to what extent the DCFR actually is the result of interaction between the 
actors participating in the formation process. This emphasis does not remedy the fact 
that the drafters of the DCFR have failed to take note of the background against which 
the DCFR was formed. Although the European Commission is insistent upon “civil 
dialogue”, this does not increase interaction between actors for various reasons.  
 has argued that in a multilevel structure, a concept is needed 
“that allows determination of the norms to be elaborated and enforced, at what level, 
and by whom.”  
First, in the formation of the DCFR, the role of the Union is very prominent.82 
In the formation of the DCFR, the Union seemingly circumvents the national level 
and turns directly to non-state actors. Unfortunately, the project fails to even address 
the question what the role of the Union and its institutions should be. Micklitz83
 
 is 
rather suspicious of the emphasis on participation and involvement:  
My hypothesis is that the process of law-making, as characterised by the 
symbolic participation of stakeholders and a cacophony of viewpoints, 
facilitates to a large extent the European Commission’s realisation of its own 
ideas. The participatory outlook hides the authoritarian character of the whole 
procedure.  
 
As the DCFR is “only” an academic text, the need to take comments into account, or 
to have other actors participate, or to account for decisions, seems less urgent. 
Collins84
                                                   
80 The Coördinatiegroep Zelfregulering is established on 15 March 1996, on the basis of article 2 and 
43 Law on Business Organisation (‘Wet op de Bedrijfsorganisatie’).   
 points out that, if the DCFR would become only an instrument of soft law, 
81 H-W Micklitz, “The visible hand of European regulatory private law. The transformation of 
European private law from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation” (2008) EUI 
Working Paper 3. 
82 This approach fits with the approach described in the White Paper on European governance, COM 
(2001) 428 final. Compare A Héritier, “The White Paper on European Governance: A response to 
shifting weights in inter-institutional decision-making” (2001) Jean Monnet Working Paper at 1-2, via 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/011301.rtf. Compare D Wallis, “European contract law 
– the way forward. Political context, Parliament’s preoccupations and process” (2006) ERA – Forum 
Special issue on European Contract Law – Developing the Principles for a ‘Common Frame of 
Reference’ for European Contract Law, 8. 
83 H-W Micklitz, “The visible hand of European regulatory private law. The transformation of 
European private law from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation” (2008) EUI 
Working Paper 29. 
84 H Collins, The European Civil Code. The Way Forward (2008) 87. 
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the European Commission can avoid a legislative process as well as a political 
debate.85
Second, interaction is further hindered by a lack of transparency. In the 
drafting of the DCFR, it is not clear what actors have had a decisive influence in the 
process, apart from the drafters: the outline edition publishes the principles, 
definitions, and model rules, where it would be logical if these provisions would be 
preceded by the commentaries. Moreover, it would be logical to explain choices with 
regard to “best practices”.
 Instead, the European Commission relies directly on legal experts and 
interests groups. Collins goes on to emphasise that the formation of the DCFR is not 
an open process, but the European Commission might still use the final version of the 
DCFR, the political Common Frame of Reference, as if it were a technocratic 
solution.  
86 This is unfortunate, as the legitimacy of an academic text 
would depend upon the academic deliberation of the drafters.87 The lack of clarity of 
the origins of the provisions of the DCFR and what stakeholders have influenced the 
drafting process hinders academic debate – and should this not be the purpose of an 
“academic” DCFR? The sources that have influenced the DCFR, especially the 
PECL, have also not been subject to thorough debate.88
Third, the representativeness of the participants in the formation of the DCFR 
is open to serious doubts for various reasons. The European Commission decides 
what actors are to be included in the formation of the DCFR, and to what extent they 
are included. In the drafting of the DCFR, the European Commission understands 
participation of “civil society” to mean a prominent role for stakeholders in the CFR-
net. This network of stakeholders’ experts had the opportunity to discuss the drafts for 
the DCFR. Member States’ experts, however, are not mentioned in this respect.
 Moreover, the stage at which 
more precise discussion and participation is possible is relevant: In a later stage, when 
the commentaries on the DCFR have made clear what decisions lie behind the 
provisions of the DCFR, discussion and comments could be more precise, but it may 
be harder to adapt both the form and content of the DCFR. 
89
                                                   
85 See critically M W Hesselink, “The Common Frame of Reference as a source of European private 
law” (2008) Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series, 33-36. See 
similarly Study Group on Social Justice in Private Law, “Social justice in European contract law: A 
manifesto” (2004) ELJ 673-674. 
 The 
reason for this division of roles between stakeholders and state experts is unclear. 
86 Ch Twigg-Flesner, “The Acquis Principles: An insider’s critical reflections on the drafting process” 
in C Baasch Andersen and M Andeneas (eds), Theory and practice of harmonisation, forthcoming (via 
www.ssrn.com) 19. 
87 C Joerges, “The challenges of Europeanization in the realm of private law: A plea for a new legal 
discipline” (2004) EUI Working Paper 11. 
88 H Eidenmüller et al, “The Common Frame of References for European Private Law”, (2008) 28 
OJLS 699. Also S Vogenauer, “Common Frame of Reference and UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts: Coexistence, competition or overkill of soft law?” (2010) Oxford 
Legal Research Paper Series, 44, forthcoming in 6 ERCL 2010, available via www.ssrn.com, who asks 
why the PECL where chosen over the UNIDROIT Principles, which have a global scope instead of a 
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3.3.4. Implications of the multilevel governance analysis for the DCFR 
It has been argued that the drafters of the DCFR have not taken into account the 
background against which the DCFR has been formed, of which background 
multilevel governance provides a useful analysis. In particular, the following 
conclusions come to mind. 
First, this paper has sought to argue that governance questions on what actors 
possess key resources affect the formation of private law, and provides a perspective 
on how private law should be formed. Even though national private law discourse 
does not explicitly refer to “governance”, it (maybe unwittingly) already takes into 
account the implications of “governance”, for example by including experts in the 
formation of private law or by accommodating a role for non-state actors within the 
Civil Code. Similarly, although European private law discourse does not extensively 
discuss governance, some directives in the private law acquis do accommodate a role 
for non-state actors. 
Second, because of the multilevel structure of European private law, the 
DCFR may not without discussion adapt a hierarchical Civil Code approach. Ignoring 
this question ignores the interdependence between actors. With regard to the DCFR, 
the dependence of the Union on states for implementation and enforcement is 
especially relevant. Also, the drafters of the DCFR should be able to take the 
interaction between these actors into account.91
Third, this interdependence also exists between state actors and non-state 
actors because of the fragmented possession of key resources.
 A hierarchical approach may be 
hindered by this interdependence between actors.  
92
Fourth, by considering its multilevel background, arguably, the DCFR could 
have indicated, at a European level, that questions of governance may arise in the 
formation of European private law. In a system of multilevel governance, key 
 The DCFR does not 
recognise this, as becomes apparent when looking at the rules on unfair contract terms 
in the DCFR. In not looking at well established self-regulation such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) models or standard contract terms, 
without apparent reason, the drafters of the DCFR have decreased the chance that 
businesses will refer to the DCFR, and, consequently, they have decreased the chance 
that national judges will take the DCFR into account when deciding on business-to-
business contracts. In this view, the DCFR apparently fails to recognise that its 
success may also depend on the actual use made of these rules by non-state actors.  
                                                   
90 M W Hesselink, “Who has a stake in European contract law?” (2005) ERCL 295-296. See for the list 
of stakeholders in the CFR-Net 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/cfr_net_members_en.pdf.  
91 Ch Twigg-Flesner, “The Acquis Principles: An insider’s critical reflections on the drafting process” 
in C Baasch Andersen and M Andeneas (eds), Theory and practice of harmonisation, forthcoming (via 
www.ssrn.com) 19. 
92 Compare C Scott, “Regulating private legislation” in F Cafaggi and H. Muir Watt (eds), Making 
European private law. Governance design (2008) 254. 
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resources are fragmented and non-state actors such as the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Assocation (ISDA) or the European Trade Association representing e-
commerce and mail-order (EMOTA) may possess information or organisational 
capabilities that can contribute to the formation of the DCFR. Furthermore, it is 
especially necessary to take the interaction between the European legislator and the 
national legislator into account, as these actors share competences to provide 
European private law. The formation process of the DCFR should have recognised it 
was necessary to answer questions of governance before forming the DCFR, whether 
within or outside the DCFR. As the DCFR was intended to reform the private law 
acquis, and part of that acquis refers directly to governance questions, it would not be 
illogical for the DCFR to also consider these questions. In that case, the substance of 
the DCFR could address or accommodate questions of governance. The multilevel 
structure prompts the development of a concept that could give guidelines on the 
question what actors may be competent to develop or enforce what norms at what 
level.93 More generally, the DCFR should have recognised that, if only to coordinate 
the diverging objectives of national and supranational actors, a mechanism to enhance 
the coexistence of conflicting laws and traditions is necessary.94
Fifth, even though the DCFR at first sight is a typical “governance” 
instrument, it has not looked at the multilevel structure of European private law and 
implications for the way in which private law frameworks are formed. The inclusion 
of “civil society” does nothing to remedy this oversight. 
 In these ways, first, 
the multilevel structure should have affected the way in which the DCFR was formed.  
Second, the multilevel structure could influence the sort of norms that are either to be 
developed apart from the DCFR or to be included in the DCFR itself. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, it has been argued that European private law has a multilevel character, 
as recognised by many authors, in which actors have become interdependent and non-
state actors, or self-regulation provided by non-state actors, may also play a role. It 
has been argued that multilevel governance provides a useful analysis of European 
private law, and moreover, that the DCFR ignores this analysis.  
 While the multilevel character of European private law has been recognised, 
governance is not usually a subject in national private law debate. The question of 
governance is already answered when a Civil Code has been formed, and in national 
private law, alternative methods to exert authority take place within the framework 
provided by that Civil Code. Accordingly, the governance view in this paper 
highlights the formation of European private law. More specifically, the governance 
view provides an additional perspective on how private law should be formed: by 
taking into account the multilevel structure of European private law and the 
                                                   
93 H-W Micklitz, “The visible hand of European regulatory private law. The transformation of 
European private law from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation” (2008) EUI 
Working Paper 3. 
94 C Joerges, “The challenges of Europeanization in the realm of private law: A plea for a new legal 
discipline” (2004) EUI Working Paper 45. 
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fragmented possession of ‘key resources’. This paper has sought to argue that in the 
formation of national as well as supranational law, the implications of the governance 
perspective are, maybe unwittingly, already addressed, when private law 
accommodates a role for non-state actors. The multilevel character of European 
private law leads to questions of governance, as it becomes necessary to take into 
account shared competences and the coexistence of private laws at different levels. 
The characteristics of a multilayered system, in which not only legal competences to 
form private law are shared, but also key resources such as expertise, organisational 
capabilities, or financial resources, necessitates that in forming European private law, 
questions after what actor possesses these resources and the interaction between these 
actors should precede the formation of European private law. In turn, in a multilevel 
structure in which actors have become interdependent, actors need to adopt 
approaches in the formation of European private law that can cope with this structure 
of multiple levels and interdependence. Accordingly, the formation of European 
private law, as well as substantive European private law, has changed. 
Although the DCFR at first sight can be qualified as such a “governance” 
instrument, this paper has sought to argue that the DCFR has not looked towards 
multilevel governance. This becomes apparent when looking at the hierarchical, Civil 
Code approach of the DCFR, while in a system of multilevel governance, the 
interdependence between actors may pose problems for this approach. Not only is the 
supranational legislator dependent upon the state for implementation and 
enforcement, state actors may also be dependent upon non-state actors. Clearly, the 
form and hierarchical character of the DCFR have not been carefully considered; 
instead, the national model of a Civil Code has simply been transposed to a European 
level. This approach has rightly been criticised. When looking more closely towards 
multilevel governance literature, it becomes clear that the form and the hierarchical 
approach of the DCFR would fit better within a federation of states.  
Similarly, the success of the DCFR may be dependent upon the use made of 
the DCFR by contracting parties and national judges. The DCFR fails to recognise 
this interdependence. Furthermore, the DCFR fails to recognise that non-state actors, 
and rules established by non-state actors, may contribute to the formation to the 
DCFR, and that alternative approaches are possible. In these alternative approaches, 
the DCFR could first look to key resources that non-state actors possess and try to 
make use of those resources, and look to often-used self-regulation in forming the 
DCFR. Second, the DCFR could address the role of non-state actors, directly or 
indirectly, in the DCFR itself. This is possible at a national level and more 
prominently visible in the private law acquis. Despite the visibility of these 
governance questions in some of the private law acquis, the DCFR does not address 
or accommodate questions of governance. The inclusion of “civil society” in the 
formation of the DCFR has not helped to balance this failure. 
 By considering its multilevel background, arguably, the DCFR could have 
indicated, at a European level, that questions of governance may arise in the 
formation of European private law. In a system of multilevel governance, key 
resources are fragmented and non-state actors may possess information or 
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organisational capabilities that can contribute to the formation of the DCFR. These 
fragmented resources should similarly be taken into account when forming private 
law in general. Moreover, the DCFR could have prompted the development of 
guidelines that may clarify what actors are competent to form private law at what 
level. In addition, the DCFR could have provided some coordination for currently 
coexisting private laws.   
 
